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INSANITY AND RELATED ISSUES 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
OCT- 'l 10R7 
Case Western Reserve University 
The insanity defense has long been controversial, and 
thus it is not surprising that efforts to "reform" the de-
fense periodically surface. The acquittal of JOhn Hinckley 
has spawned another period of reexamination. United 
States v. Hinckley, Crim. No. 81-306 (D. D.C. June 21, 
1982). The American Psychiatric Association, the Nation-
al Commission on the Insanity Defense, and the Ameri-
can Bar Association have all taken positions on the issue. 
Moreover, legislatures have responded with a number of 
statutory revisions. This article surveys these "reform" 
efforts, as well as several related evidentiary issues. In 
addition, diminished capacity and competency to stand 
trial are examined. 
At the outset, it seems helpful to acknowledge the pub-
lic perception of the insanity defense because that per-
ception undoubtedly influences the legislative response. 
One commentator, citing the findings of the National 
;·? Commission on the Insanity Defense, wrote: 
The commission report found that the public's perceptions 
of the insanity defense are largely formed by selective news 
reporting, and it sought to separate the myth from the reality. 
For example, the Commission discovered that, contrary to 
public perceptions, the insanity defense is rarely used and is 
infrequently successful. It noted, too, that the public believes 
"most insanity defendants are murderers who commit ran-
dom acts of violence," although in reality. most insanity de-
fendants are charged with committing nonviolent crimes. 
Further, most acquittees are confined for long periods of 
time. The Commission also found that the well-publicized 
case is the exception, not the rule. In fact, "[m)ost insanity 
cases relfect agreement among the experts, the defense, 
and the prosecution." Few go to trial and even fewer go to a 
jury. Wexler, Redefining the Insanity Problem, 53 Geo. Wash. 
L. Rev. 528, 537-38 (1985), citing National Mental Health 
Association, Myths and Realities: A Report of the National 
Commission on the Insanity Defense (1983). 
INSANITY TESTS 
Insanity raises a legal, not medical, issue: whether a 
defendant, due to his mental condition, should be held 
criminally responsible for his conduct. Various legal tests 
have been used to define insanity. 
Under the M'Naghten rule (1843), sometimes known 
as the "right-wrong" test, insanity exists if: 
~Public Defender Hyman Friedman 
[A]t the time of the committing of the act, the party accused 
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease 
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act 
he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he 
was doing what was wrong. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 
718, 722 (1843). 
Many jurisdictions supplemented the M'Naghten test, 
which focuses on cognition, with a volitional or control 
test. This test exonerates a defendant who, due to his 
mental condition, cannot control his conduct even 
though he knew what he was doing and knew it was 
wrong. This test is often referred to as the "irresistible 
impulse" test. That term, however, is misleading because 
it suggests that a sudden impulse is required, which is 
usually not the case. W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 
284 (1972)("[1]n practice the test is broader than the mis-
leading 'irresistible impulse' language suggests, for the 
jury is not ordinarily told that the defendant must have 
acted upon a sudden impulse or that his acts must have 
been totall¥ irresistible."). 
Durham Test 
The M'Naghten and "irresistible impulse" tests repre-
sented the principal tests for insanity until the 1950s. In 
that decade two noteworthy changes were proposed. In 
1954, the famous Durham decision, rejected both 
M'Naghten and its volitional supplement and in their 
place substituted a "product test." Durham v. United 
States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). According to the 
D.C. CircJ.Jit, an "accused is not criminally responsible if 
his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or 
mental defect." /d. at 874-75. After numerous attempts to 
clarify the Durham rule, the D.C. Circuit overruled Dur-
ham in 1972. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972). See generally Symposium, United States v. 
Brawner, 1973 Wash. U.L.O. 17-154. 
Model Penal Code Test 
Soon after the Durham case had been decided, the 
drafters of the Model Penal Code (MPC) proposed a dif-
ferent insanity test: "A person is not responsible for crimi-
nal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of 
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity 
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his 
Telephone (216) 443-7223 
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conduct orto conform his conduct to the requirements of 
1aW.·'N1&8~1l't;r18TcaCfe·§·4:o1 (Propos-ed official Draft 
1962). The MPGtest can be described as a "modernized 
versipn~9f theM'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests." 
W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 292 (1972). Although 
the MPC test contains the cognitive and volitional prongs 
of the earlier tests, both prongs are modified by the term 
"substantial." Thus, unlike the earlier tests, complete 
. cognitive incapacity or complete lack of control is not re-
. qui red under the MPC test. The MPC test eventually be-
came the majority rule in this country. See P. Low, J. 
Jeffries & R. Bonnie, Criminal Law 659 (1982) ("The Mod-
el Penal Code testhas been adopted ... in more than 
half of the states; it is also used in the federal courts."). 
Nevertheless, the MPC test, like the M'Naghten and ir-
resistible impulse tests, was the subject of criticism. Dis-
satisfaction with the insanity defense remained. See 
Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis 
of Mental Health Law, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 527, 640A5 
(1978). The successful use of the insanity defense by 
John Hinckley in his trial for the attempted assassination 
of President Reagan increased this dissatisfaction. 
Consequently, several changes in the insanity defense 
have been proposed or adopted. Some of the proposed 
changes, such as the guilty but mentally ill verdict, pre-
dated the Hinckley decision. 
Abolition 
A few jurisdictions have abolished the insanity de-
fense. E.g., Idaho Code§ 18-207 (Supp. 1985); Mont. 
Code Ann.§ 46-14-102 (1985); Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-305(1)(Supp. 1985).1"hese statutes permit evidence 
of mental abnormality only to negate the mens rea of the 
char.ged.offense. For-example, the Montana statute pro-
viaes: ''Evidence of mental disease or defect is not ad-
missible in atrialon the_meritsJJD!f:!sS the defendant ... 
files a written notice of his purpose to rely on a mental 
disease or defect to prove that he did not have a particu-
lar state of mind which is an essential element of the of-
fense charged." Mont. Code. Ann.§ 46-14-102 (1983). 
See generally Comment, After Abolition: The Present 
State of the Insanity Defense in Montana, 45 Mont. L. 
Rev. 133 (1984). 
The ABA Mental Health Standards reject the aboli-
tionist position on policy grounds: 
Questions regarding the defense are moral rather than 
scientific questions .... To label as criminals those so se-
verely disturbedthat they.could not appreciate the wrongful-
nessof their acts offends the moral tenets of the criminal law 
and the moral intuitions of the community. This approach 
would mean that judges and juries would be forced either to 
return convictions which would be morally obtuse or to 
acquit in outright defiance of the law. The abolitionist 
approach ... would prevent the exercise of humane moral 
judgement- and it is that exercise which has distinguished 
our criminal law heritage. ABA, Criminal Justice Mental 
Health Standards 7-263 to -264 (1st Tent. Draft 1983). 
For a discussion of the policy issues involved in the aboli-
tion of the insanity defense, compare N. Morris, Madness 
and the Criminal Law (1982) (favoring abolition), with 
Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Recon-
sidered, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 777 (1985) (favoring retention). 
The commentary to the ABA Standards also ques-
tioned the constitutionality of abolition. ABA Standards, 
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supra, at 7-262 ("This issue of basic fairness may be of 
constitutional dimension."). Nevertheless, the Montana 
Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the 
Montana statute. State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992 (Mont. 
1984) .. 
Burden of Proof 
Traditionally, the initial burden of production or going 
forward with evidence of insanity has been placed on the 
defendant, either because insanity was explicitly recog-
nized as an affirmative defense or because of the pre-
sumption of sanity. The burden of persuasion, however, 
was differen~. Some jurisdictions placed this burden on 
the defendant, while others placed it on the prosecution. 
In 1972 a leading text could make the following state-
ment: "In about half of the states and the federal govern-
ment, this burden rests with prosecution; in these-juris-
dictions the prosecution must then proceed to prove re-
sponsibility beyond a reasonable doubt." W. LaFave & A. 
Scott, Criminal Law 313 (1972). 
Recent statutory changes have altered this picture. 
They restrict the insanity defense by allocating the 
burden of persuasion to the defendant. In some jurisdic-
tions, the standard of proof placed on the defendant is a 
preponderance of evidence. E.g. Ind. Code Ann.§ 
35-41-4-1(b) (West Supp. 1985); Iowa Code Ann.§ 701.4 
(West Supp. 1985); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 315(a) 
(Purdon 1983). Other jurisdictions require the defendant 
to establish insanity by clear and convincing evidence. 
E.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 20 (b) (West Supp. 1985); Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 13-502(B) (Supp. 1985); S.D. Codified Laws 
Ann.§ 22-5-10 (Supp. 1985). 
The constitutionality of allocating to the defense the 
burden of persuasion on insanity has been upheld by the 
Supreme Court. In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 
(1952), the Court upheld a state rule allocating the bur-
den of persuasion to the defendant. Nevertheless, the 
Court's later decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 
(1975), although not involving the insanity defense, cast 
some doubt on the continued vitality of Leland. However, 
when the Court was presented with the insanity issue in 
a subsequent case, it dismissed for want of a substantial 
federal question, a disposition which is accorded prece-
dential weight. Rivera v. State, 351 A.2d 561 (Del. 1976), 
appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 877 (1976). See also Krzemin-
ski v. Perini, 614 F.2d 121 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
866 (1980); C. McCormick, Evidence 990 (3d ed. 1984). 
If, however, insanity is treated under state law as an ele-
ment of a· crime, due process precludes the state from al-
locating the burden of persuasion to the defendant. Duffy 
v. Foltz, 772 F.2d 1271, 1277 (6th Cir. 1985) ("[W]e con-
clude that ... sanity [under Michigan law] was an ele-
ment of the crime tor federal due process purposes."). 
Rejection of the Volitional Test 
Another recent change involves the rejection of the 
volitional or irresistible impulse prong of the insanity de-
fense. For example, the ABA Mental Health Standards 
provide that a person "is not responsible for criminal con-
duct if, at the time of such conduct, and as a result of 
mental disease or detect, that person was unable to ap-
preciate the wrongfulness of such conduct." ABA Stan-
dard 7-6.1 (1984). This test does not recognize lack of 
control as a defense. The principal argument for this 
change is the lack of a 
scientific basis for measuring a person's capacity for self-
control or for calibrating the impairment of that capacity. 
There is, in short, no objective basis for distinguishing 
between offenders who were undeterrable and those who 
were merely undeterred, between the impulse that was 
irresistible and the impulse not resisted, or between 
substantial impairment of capacity and some lesser impair-
ment. Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 
A.B.A.J. 194, 196 (1983). 
This position is supported by the American Psychiatric 
Association, which concluded that the "line between an 
irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted is proba-
bly no sharper than that between twilight and dusk." 
American Psychiatric Association Statement on the In-
sanity Defense, 140 Am. J. Psychiatry 681, 685 (1983). 
The Fifth Circuit adopted the ABA approach soon after it 
was proposed. United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 
248-49 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 323 (1984). 
In October 1984, Congress enacted the first federal in-
sanity statute. This statute provides: 
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Fed-
eral statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts 
constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a 
severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate 
the nature and quality of the wrongfulness of his acts. 18 
U.S.C.A. § 20(a) (West Supp. 1985). 
Like the ABA test, the federal test eliminates the volition-
al prong of the insanity defense; thus, whether or not a 
defendant can control his conduct is no longer relevant. 
The federal statute does, however, differ from the ABA 
proposal in one important respect. Under the ABA propo-
sal, once insanity is raised the prosecution has the bur-
den of proving the defendant sane beyond a reasonable 
doubt. ABA Standard 7-6.9 (1984). Under the federal stat-
ute, the defendant has the burden of proving insanity by 
clear and convincing evidence. 18 U.S.C.A. § 20(b) (West 
Supp. 1985). · 
Similarly, California has returned to the M'Naghten 
rule. For over a century California followed this rule. In 
1978, however, the California Supreme Court adopted the 
MPC test. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 
149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978). In 1982 the voters adopted an 
initiative measure, known as Proposition 8, which estab-
lished a statutory definition of insanity. Cal. Penal Code§ 
25(b) (West 1986). This provision reinstated the M'Nagh-
ten rule. See People v. Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d 765, 704 P.2d 
752, 217 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1985). 
Guilty But Mentally Ill 
Another "reform" effort involves the adoption of a 
"guilty but mentally ill" (GBMI) verdict. This verdict is an 
alternative to a not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) 
verdict; it does not replace the NGRI verdict. E.g., Alaska 
Stat.§ 12.47.030 (Supp. 1985); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 
408 (Supp. 1984); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-131 (Supp. 1985); 
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38 § 115-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); 
Ind. Code Ann.§§ 35-36-2-3 (West Supp. 1985); Ky. Rev. 
Stat.§ 504.120 (Supp. 1984); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.§ 
768.36 (1982); N.M. Stat. Ann.§§ 31-9-3, 31-9-4 (1984); 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 314 (Purdon 1983); S.D. Codified 
Laws Ann. § 23A-7-2 (Supp. 1985). 
In 1975 Michigan was the first state to adopt this ver-
dict. Studies of the GBMI verdict indicate that this verdict 
has not had the effect its proponents anticipated, i.e., a 
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substantial decrease in the number of NGRI acquittals. 
One study reported: "An empirical analysis of the GBMI 
verdict indicates that the verdict is not functioning as 
expected. The NGRI verdict continues to be used in 
Michigan courts." Project, Evaluating Michigan's Guilty 
But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical Study, 16 U. Mich. 
J.L. Ref. 77, 104 (1982). This study also found that "most 
defendants found GBMI would probably have received 
guilty verdicts in the absence of the GBMI statute" and 
"although the verdict was designed for jury trials, over 
60% of those defendants found GBMI have come 
through plea-bargains and another 20% have come from 
bench trials." /d. Another commentator has stated: 
The guilty but mentally [ill] verdict does not seem to be 
achieving its intended goals. It has not substantially reduced 
insanity acquittals nor enhanced public safety. It has not 
appreciably improved treatment for mentally ill offenders 
and has failed to affect expert involvement in criminal adju-
dications .... 
At the same time, guilty but mentally ill legislation has 
injected a misleading and confusing element into criminal 
adjudications .... Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill 
Verdict: An Idea Whose Time Should Not Have Come, 53 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 494, 517 (1985). 
See also McGraw, Farthing-Capowich & Keilitz, The 
"Guilty But Mentally Ill" Plea and Verdict: Current State of 
the Knowledge, 30 Viii. L. Rev. 117 (1985); Britton & Ben-
nett, Adopt Guilty But Mentally Ill?- No!, 15 U. Tol. L. 
Rev. 203 (1983); Fentiman, "Guilty But Mentally Ill": The 
Real Verdict Is Guilty, 26 B.C. L. Rev. 601 (1985); Stelzner 
& Piatt, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict and Plea in New 
Mexico, 13 N.M.L. Rev. 99 (1983); Note, Criminal Respon-
sibility: Changes in the Insanity Defense and the "Guilty 
But Mentally Ill" Response, 21 Washburn L.J. 515 (1982); 
Note, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict and Due Process, 
92 Yale L.J. 475 (1983). 
Constitutional chall,enges to GBMIIegislation have 
been unsuccessful. See Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651 (Alas-
ka App. 1985); Keener v. State, 254 Ga. 699, 334 S.E.2d 
175 (1985); People v. Ramsey, 422 Mich. 500, 375 N.W.2d 
297 (1985). 
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 
Expert Testimony 
In some cases the qualifications of an expert to testify 
in support of an insanity defense has been an issue. For 
example, in Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. 
Cir. 1962), the trial court held that a psychologist was not 
competent to give an opinion concerning a mental dis-
ease or defect, apparently on the grounds that psycholo-
gists lack medical training. The D.C. Circuit reversed. 
According to the court, many psychologists, due to their 
training and experience, would not be qualified to testify 
concerning a mental disease or defect. Other psycholo-
gists, however, have extensive training and experience in 
the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders and 
would therefore be qualified. Thus, it is not the title of 
"psychologist" that is determinative but rather the nature 
and extent of the individual psychologist's knowledge. /d. 
at 644-45. 
The ABA Standards go beyond the traditional qualifi-
cation rules and require more stringent standards, in-
cluding minimum clinical educational and training re-
j-.i.L. l'c ,, 
1
··.: 
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quirements. ABAStandard 7c3.11(a) (1984). In addition, 
an expert is not permitted to testify concerning a person's 
mental condtion unless he has conducted a thorough 
evaluation, including a personal interview. ABA Standard 
7-3.11(a) (3) (1984). 
See generally Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental 
Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case 
for Informed Speculation, 66 Va. L. Rev. 427 (1980); Dia-
mond & Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: 
Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 
1335 (1965); Morris, Mental Health Professionals in the 
Criminal Justice Process: The A.B.A. Standards, 21 Grim. 
L. BUll. 321 (1985); Wells, The 1984 A.B.A. Criminal Jus-
tice Mental Health Standards and the Expert Witness: 
New Therapy for a Troubled Relationship?, 13 W. St. U.L. 
Rev. 79 (1985). 
Ultimate Issue Rule 
Another evidentiary issue that has caused difficulty is 
the so-called "ultimate issue" rule. In other words, may 
an expert testify that the defendant was insane or knew 
the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the of-
fense? Such an opinion might be excluded because it 
involves an "ultimate issue" in the case. For example, 
Federal Evidence Rule704(b) provides: 
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state 
or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an 
opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did 
not have the mental state or condition constituting an ele-
ment of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ulti-
mate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone. 
According to the legislative history, this provision was 
intended, in part, "to eliminate the confusing spectacle of 
cdriipetifigexpert Witnesses testifying to directly contra-
dictory conclusions as to the ultimate legal issue to be 
found by the trier of fact." S. Rep; No: 225, 98th Gong., 2d 
Sess. 230, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Gong. & Ad. News 
3182,3412. 
The underlying problem with such an opinion, howev-
er, is not that it embraces an "ultimate issue" but rather 
that it is beyond the witness' expertise. Undoubtedly, a 
psychiatrist or psychologist who has spent years diag-
nosing and treating mental disorders can provide a jury 
with much helpful information about the origin and ef-
fects of a mental disorder. Nevertheless, insanity involves 
a legal (moral), not a medical, issue, and therefore, no 
matter how the test for insanity is phrased, a psychiatrist 
or psychologist is no more qualified than any other per-
son to give an opinion about whether a particular defen-
dant's mental condition statisfies the legal test for insan-
ity. See also ABA Standard 7-6.6 (1984). 
For general references on the insanity defense, see W. 
LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law§§ 36-38 (1972); R. Per-
kins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law 950-95 (3d ed. 1982); 2 P. 
Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses§ 173 (1984); Wilkin-
son & Roberts, Insanity Defense, 41 Am. Jur. Proof of 
Facts2d 615 (1985). See also An not., 56 A.L.R.Fed. 326 
(1982) (modern federal cases); Annot., 9 A.L.R.4th 526 
(1981) (modern state cases). 
''DIMINISHED CAPACJTY'' 
Psychiatric and psychological testimony also may be 
admissible to show that a defendant's mental condition, 
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even though not amounting to insanity, precluded him 
from having the mental state required by the charged 
offense. In other words, his mental condition negates the 
requisite mens rea. The ABA Standards recognize the 
admissibility of such evidence: "Evidence, including ex- t 
\ pert testimony, concerning the defendant's mental condi-
tion at the time of the alleged offense which tends to 
show the defendant did or did not have the mental state 
required for the offense charged should be admissible." 
ABA Standard 7-6.2 (1984). Similarly, the Model Penal 
Code § 4.02(1) provides: "Evidence that the defendant 
suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible 
whenever it is re[gy_ant to prove that the defendant did or 
did not have a state of mind that is an element of the 
offense." 
This issue is sometimes called "diminished capacity" 
or "partial responsibility." One commentator summarized 
the argument for this defense as follows: 
The logic of the partial responsibility doctrine would seem to 
be unassailable. The reception of evidence of the -defen-
dant's abnormal mental condition, totally apart from the 
defense of insanity, is certainly appropriate whenever that 
evidence is relevant to the issue of whether he had the men-
tal state which is a necessary element of the crime charged. 
Were it otherwise, major crimes specifically requiring a cer-
tain bad state of mind would, in effect, be strict liability of-
fenses as applied to abnormal defendants. W. LaFave & A. 
Scott, Criminal Law 331 (1972). 
The mens rea defense differs from insanity in anum-
ber of ways. If an insanity defense is successful, the re-
sult is a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity (al-
though commitment is typical). A successful mens rea 
defense results in an acquittal of the charged offense, 
but permits conviction of a lesser included offense, e.g., 
second degree murder rather than first degree murder. 
Many jurisdictrons recognlz'EHhis "mens rea" defense. 
In some states statutory provisions govern the issue. 
E.g., Alaska Stat. § 12.47.020 (1984); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 
41-602 (1977); Hawaii Rev. Stat.§ 704-401 (1976); Idaho 
Code§ 18-208 (1979); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 38 
(1983); Mo. Ann. Stat.§ 552.030 (3) (Vernon Supp. 1986); 
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-14-102 (1985); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C: 
4-2 (West 1982); Utah Code Ann.§ 76-2-305 {1) (Supp. 
1985). In other states, case law recognizes this defense. 
E.g., Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385, 392-95 (Colo. 
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1225 {1983); Novosel v. Hel-
gemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 125, 3~4 A.2d 124, 130 {1978). 
The scope of the mens rea defense, however, is not the 
same in every jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions, evi-
dence on this issue is limited to "specific intent" crimes. 
E.g., State v. Hines, 187 Conn. 199, 204, 445 A.2d 314, 
317 (1982); State v. Jacoby, 260 N.W.2d 828, 836 (Iowa 
1977); State v. Dargatz, 228 Kan. 322, 332, 614 P.2d 430, 
438 (1980); State v. Muir, 432 A.2d 1173, 1176 (R.I. 1981); 
State v. Edmon, 28 Wash, App. 98, 102, 621 P.2d 1310, 
1313 (1981). In other jurisdictions the defense is limited to 
homicide cases. In homicide cases, psychiatric testimo-
ny is admissible on the issue of premeditation, the distin-
guishing element between first and second degree 
murder. E.g., Waye v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 683, 695, 
251 S.E.2d 202, 209, cert. denied, 442 U.S. 924 (1979). 
A substantial number of courts, however, refuse to 
recognize this defense and thus preclude the admissibili-
ty of expert testimony on this issue. E.g., Bates v. State, 
386 A.2d 1139, 1143-44 (Del. 1978); Bethea v. United 
States, 365 A.2d 64, 92 (D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 
911 (1977); Zeigler v. State, 402 So.2d 365, 373 (Fla. 
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035 (1985); State v. 
Edwards, 420 So.2d 663, 678 (La. 1982); Johnson v. 
State, 292 Md. 405, 425-26, 439 A.2d 542, 554 (1982); 
State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. 1982); 
State v. Wilcox, ?0 Ohio St.2d 182, 199, 436 N.E.2d 523, 
533 (1982). 
The new federal insanity statute appears to follow this 
view; it provides that, except for insanity, "[m]ental dis-
ease or defect does not ... constitute a defense." 18 
U.S.C.A. § 20(a) (West Supp. 1985). The First Circuit has 
remarked: "(T]he recently enacted Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act of 1984 ... abolished 'diminished ca-
pacity' as a defense." United States v. White, 766 F.2d 
22, 25 (1st Cir. 1985). Nevertheless, a federal district 
court has reached the opposite conclusion: 
[W]e find that § 20 represents an attempt by Congress to 
define the circumstances in which an otherwise culpable 
defendant will be excused for his or her conduct because of 
mental disease or defect, and that the section has no effect 
on the admissibility of evidence offered by a defendant to 
negate the existence of specific intent and thereby show his 
or her innocence. United States v. Frisbee,.38 Crim. L. Rep. 
(BNA) 2284,2285 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 1985). 
Constitutional Issues 
The exclusion of defense evidence that rebuts an ele-
ment of an offense on which the prosecution has the bur-
den of persuasion raises constitutional issues. As one 
court has written: "The state bears the burden of proving 
every element of the offense charged; defendant cannot 
logically or constitutionally be denied the right to present 
probative evidence rebutting an element of the crime 
merely because such evidence also suggests insanity." 
People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal.3d 318,321,583 P.2d 1308, 
1310, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265, 267 (1978). See also Hendershott 
v. People, 653 P.2d 385, 393-94 (Colo. 1982), cert. denied, 
459 u.s. 1225 (1983). 
This view, however has not been accepted by all 
courts. For example, the Seventh Circuit has ruled that "a 
state is not constitutionally compelled to recognize the 
doctrine of diminished capacity and hence a state may 
exclude expert testimony offered for the purpose of es-
tablishing that a criminal defendant lacked the capacity 
to form a specific intent." Muench v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1124, 
1144-45 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984). 
Evidence of the defendant's mental condition that 
neither negates mens rea nor amounts to insanity may 
nevertheless be admissible in sentencing proceedings or 
in the penalty stage of a capital case. E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. 
§ 921.141 (6) (b) & (f) (West 1985); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§ 
2929.04 (B) (3) (Page 1982). See also ABA Standard 7-9.3 
(1984). 
For a discussion of diminished capacity, see W. LaFave 
& A. Scott, Criminal Law§ 42 (1972); R. Perkins & R. 
Boyce, Criminal Law 980-85 (3d ed. 1982); 1 P. Robinson, 
Criminal Law Defenses§ 64 (1984); Arenella, The Dimin-
ished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: 
Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 
827 (1977); Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Cases 
for Purposes Other Than the Defense of Insanity, 26 Syra-
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cuse L. Rev. 1051 (1975); Morse, Diminished Capacity: A 
Moral and Legal Conundrum, 21nt'l J.L. & Psychiatry 271 
(1979). See also Annat., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228 (1968). 
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 
In addition to insanity and the mens rea defense, psy-
chiatric testimony is often admitted when a criminal de-
fendant's competency to stand trial is an issue. Compe-
tency refers to a defendant's mental condition at the time 
of trial and should be distinguished from insanity, which 
refers to the defendant's mental condition at the time of 
the offense. Moreover, the policy issues raised by the in-
sanity defense differ substantially from those raised by 
an accused's competency to stand trial. Insanity con-
cerns a defendant's culpability for his criminal acts; it is a 
substantive criminal law issue. In contrast, mental com-
petency involves a due process issue. As the Supreme 
Court has noted, "the failure to observe procedures ade-
quate to protect a defendant's right not to be tried or con-
victed while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his 
due process right to a fair trial." Drape v. Missouri, 420 
U.S. 162, 172 (1975). See also Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 
375, 378 (1966). 
At least in terms of its impact on the criminal justice 
system, mental competency is a far more important issue 
than insanity: 
One survey ... shows that while as many as 52% of all offen-
ders in mental institutions are there because of incompe-
tence to stand trial, only 4% are committed as not guilty by 
reason of insanity. One commentator has estimated that for 
each defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity, at 
least a hundred defendants are determined to be incompe-
tent to stand trial. ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Stan-
dards 7-140 (1st Tent. Draft 1983). 
Standard for Competency 
In 1960 the Supreme Court set forth the following test 
for determining an accused's competency to stand trial: 
"[T]he test must be whether he has sufficient present 
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable de-
gree of rational understanding- and whether he has a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceed-
ings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 
402 (1960). While this test correctly indicates that compe-
tency is a legal, not a medical, issue, it nevertheless pro-
vides only a general definition of competency. 
The ABA Mental Health Standards provide further 
elaboration. First, according to the Standards, incom-
petency may arise from "mental illness, physical illness 
or disability, mental retardation or other developmental 
disability, or other etiology so long as it results in a defen-
dant's inability to consult with defense counsel or to un-
derstand the proceedings." ABA Standard 7-4.1(c) (1984). 
Second, the Standards take the position that competen-
cy should be addressed in "functional," rather than "di-
agnostic," terms. Under this approach five factors under-
lie the competency inquiry: (1) the defendant should have 
a perception of the process which is not distorted by 
mental illness or disability; (2) the defendant should have 
the capacity to maintain the attorney-client relationship; 
(3) the defendant should be able to recall and to relate 
factual information; (4) the defendant should have the 
ability to testify in his own defense, in the event that 
should be appropriate; and (5) the defendant's abilities 
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shpul<:l be aSS§)§.~~c:!LnJigbt of th~ severity of the charge 
arid the"complexity of the case. ABA Criminal Justice 
Mental Health Standards 7-152 to -154 (1st Tent. Draft 
1983}. S?~9?J1erc:liiY·Bennett,-A Guided Tour Through 
Selected ABA Standards Relating to Incompetence to 
Stand Tr-ial, 53Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 375 (1985}. 
In s01ne.cases antipsychotic drugs enable otherwise 
. unfit defendants to become competent. E.g., Govern-
ment of Virgin Islands v. Crowe, 391 F. Supp. 987, 989 
(D.V.I.}, atf'd, 529 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1975}; Ake v. State, 663 
P.2d 1, 7 (Okla. Grim. App. 1983}, rev'd on other grounds, 
105 S.Ct. 1087 (1985}; Commonwealth v. Blair, 491 Pa. 
499, 502;421A2d 656,657 (1980). One commentator 
has argued thatdue process prohibits the use of such 
drugs over a defendant's objection. Comment, Antipsy-
chotic Drug§ f:J,nd fitness to Stand Trial: The Right of the 
Unfit Accused to Refuse Treatment, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 773 
(1985). 
Procedural Requirements 
Frequently, the procedures governing an inquiry into a 
defendant's competency to stand trial are specified by 
statute. E.g., Ala. Code§ 15-16-21 (1982); Cal. Penal 
Code §1367 (West 1982); N.M; Stat. Ann.§ 31-9-1 (1984); 
Oliio Rev. Code Ann.§ 2945.37 (Page 1982); Wyo. Stat.§ 
7-11-302 (1977). See also 2 P. Robinson, Griminal Law De-
fenses 502 n.4 (1984) (listing statutes}. For example, the 
federal statute authorizes the trial court to hold a compe-
tency hearing if there. is reasonable cause to believe that 
the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental 
disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent. 
18 U.S.C.A. § 4241{a) (West Supp. 1985). This procedure 
may include a psychiatric or psychological examination. 
1~!:1,$.~Q._f..~ .§ __ 1_~'-1:1(l:>HV\fest Supp. 1985). 
The procedures relating to competency determinations 
must be read in light 9! C()J1_Stitytion_?l requirements. Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, a hearing on competency 
is mandated where the "evidence raises a 'bona fide 
doubt' as to a defendant's competence to stand trial .... " 
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966). Moreover, the 
Court has indicated that the trial court has a special re-
sponsibility to ensure that a defendant is competent at 
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trial. Drape v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 (1975} ("Even 
when a defendant is competent at the commencement of 
his trial, a trial court must always be alert to circum-
stances suggesting a change that would render the ac-
cused unable to meet the standards of competence to 
stand trial."). Finally, the Court has held that a defendant 
found to be incompetent may not be committed indefin-
itely to a mental facility without further proceedings: 
[A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is 
committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to 
trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time 
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial prob-
ability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable fu-
ture. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the 
State must either institute the customary civil commitment 
proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any 
other citizen, or release the defendant. Jackson v. Indiana, 
406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
Additional competency issues may arise when a de-
fendant pleads guilty, waives counsel, or is sentenced. 
ABA Standard 7-5.1-.3 {1984); Note, Competence to Plead 
Guilty and to Stand Trial: A New Standard When a Crimi-
nal Defendant Waives Counsel, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1139 
(1982). 
For a discussion of competency, see W. LaFave & A. 
Scott, Criminal Law§ 39 (1972}; 2· P. Robinson, Criminal 
Law Defenses § 208 (1984); R. Roesch & S. Golding, 
Competency to Stand Trial (1980); Mickenberg, Com-
petency to Stand Trial and the Mentally Retarded Defen-
dant: The Need for a Multi-Disciplinary Solution to a 
Multi-Disciplinary Problem, 17 Cal. W.L. Rev. 365 (1981}; 
Pizzi, Competency to Stand Trial in Federal Courts: Con-
ceptual and Constitutional Problems, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
21 (1977}; Wilkinson & Roberts, Defendant's Competency 
to Stand Trial, 40 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts2d 171 (1984); 
Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 921 (1985); Roesch & Golding, Who Is 
Competent to Stand Trial?, Trial 40 (Sept. 1985); Note, 
Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 454 {1967). 
See also Model Penal Code§ 4.04; Annot., 63 A.L.R.Fed. 
696 (1983); An not., 23 A.L.R.4th 493 (1983). 
